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The role of the CAP in fostering 
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case studies from Italy
The last reforms of the CAP have promoted the diffusion 
of new regulatory tools to improve the coordination of 
decisions along the agri-food supply chain. Interbranch 
organizations, protection consortia, the regulation of the 
supply for PDO products and the extension of rules rep-
resent solutions aimed at fostering the diffusion of insti-
tutionalized collective arrangements in the presence of an 
increasing uncertainty surrounding transactions. In light 
of New Institutional Economics, this paper describes and 
evaluates some interesting case studies that refer to some 
strategic sectors for the primary sectors in Italy: wine, to-
bacco and cheese. The results highlight that CAP can play 
a central role in depicting a regulatory framework that 
provides room for meso-institutions to foster the diffu-
sion of hybrid forms of collective arrangements, especially 
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1. Introduction
Agricultural products have always raised problems with coordination 
across the different stages of the supply chain, with high transaction costs as 
a consequence. Over the past few decades, the increasing deregulation of the 
European agricultural market, on the one hand, has increased the degree of 
uncertainty surrounding transactions, while on the other hand, it has further 
sandwiched farmers between the immense market power of upstream input 
suppliers and downstream food processors and retailers (Buckwell et al., 2017; 
Chatelier, 2011).
As a reaction, European authorities have provided new regulatory solutions 
to improve coordination and increase transparency along the supply chain 
(Frascarelli, 2012). In this regard, a better functioning food supply chain has 
become one of the main aims of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
Under the lens of New Institutional Economics (NIE), this paper aims to 
describe and highlight how the institutional environment established by the 
CAP affected the establishment of specific organizational solutions aimed 
at improving the coordination of decision-making and rights along the sup-
ply chain of specific agri-food sectors in Italy (Ciliberti and Frascarelli, 2017; 
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Chiodini and Frascarelli, 2016). The NIE perspective is adopted since it has 
recently introduced the concept of institutional embeddedness of organiza-
tional arrangements and, therefore, may guide the analysis of the interaction 
between the regulatory framework established by both European and national 
authorities and the diffusion of specific forms of organizational arrangements 
in the agri-food supply chain in the last decade. Particular attention is paid 
to some specific policy tools that have gained momentum thanks to reg. (EU) 
1308/2013 (i.e. Common Market Organization regulation, CMO): the exten-
sion of rules1 granted to interbranch organizations (IBOs) and the regulation 
of the supply of protection consortia for PDO products2 and wines. In this re-
gard, this paper aims to contribute to the public debate on the evaluation of 
these instruments, providing insights to both policymakers and scholars. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 reports the theoretical frame-
work of NIE, which is adopted in order to analyse and describe the effects of 
the recent changes introduced by the CAP in Italy. Section 2 briefly describes 
the methodology adopted and the source of information used to describe the 
cases under analysis. Then, the latters are reported and described in Section 
3 to shed light on the functioning of the policy tools under investigation. Fi-
nally, Section 4 discusses the results and offers useful insights for the debate 
on the role of public institutions in fostering the adoption of hybrid forms of 
collective arrangements.
2. Theoretical framework
Having in mind the rules of thumb of transaction cost economics (TCE) 
– which state that a transaction-specific governance structure is more fully de-
veloped where transactions are recurrent, entail idiosyncratic investment and 
are executed under greater uncertainty – a new awareness is emerging in the 
NIE field: the institutional embeddedness of a variety of organizational solu-
1 Article 164 CMO Regulation (n. 1308/2013) provides for the possibility that rules adop-
ted by an IBO can be extended to non-members of the IBO. The member state can only 
extend such rules for a limited period of time and upon request of the IBO. The extended 
rules should not cause any damage to other operators in the member state concerned or 
the union.
2 Article 164 CMO Regulation establishes that member states are allowed, under certain con-
ditions, to apply rules to regulate the supply of PDO/PGI cheeses upon request of a produ-
cer organisation (PO), an interbranch organisation (IBO) or a PDO/PGI group. This mea-
sure is aimed at ensuring the value added and quality of cheeses with a protected designa-
tion of origin (PDO) or protected geographical indications (PGI), which are particularly 
important for vulnerable rural regions.
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tions (Ménard, 2014b; Williamson, 2000). Deeply rooted in the Coasian tradi-
tion, the Williamsonian approach is aware that organizational arrangements 
are embedded in their institutional rules. Williamson (1993) certainly recog-
nized that, since there are strategic feedback mechanisms at stake, the mac-
ro-institutions matter in influencing the governance of contractual relations. 
Moreover, it must be considered that, for an arrangement to be implemented 
and to remain sustainable, there is the need to gain institutional legitimacy on 
which also depends the capacity to enforce the rules of the game (Royer et al., 
2015). 
Consequently, the set of rules, laws, policies, customs and norms that de-
termine the rules of the game has to be taken into consideration since organi-
zational arrangements are embedded and enforced in this institutional envi-
ronment (Davis and North, 1971; Ménard and Valceschini, 2005). Such a topic 
deserves particular attention where governance forms are highly affected by 
macro-institutions, as is the case for the agri-food sectors.
Mènard (2012; 2017) clearly gives the example of the macro-institutional 
rules regarding agriculture that are defined at the level of the European Un-
ion through the “Common Agricultural Policy” and are therefore embedded 
into national laws according to the “subsidiarity” principle. However, since 
rules are also translated, adapted and implemented through specific institu-
tional arrangements, the concept of meso-institutions is properly introduced. 
Meso-institutions can be understood as “the set of mechanisms and devices 
through which general rules and rights established at the macro level are 
translated, interpreted, adapted and implemented, thus framing the domain 
within which alternative organizational arrangements, the micro-institutions, 
draw and operate transactions and through which they transmit their expec-
tations and requirements to the macro-level”. It follows that meso-institutions 
differ on the one hand from macro-institutions, in that they strictly operate 
within the general rules defined by the latter, and, on the other hand, from 
the micro-layer at which other organizational arrangements operate. Indeed, 
they do not implement actual transactions: they do not produce and deliver 
actual goods and services that are inputs to other organizations or that are 
delivered to consumers.
In this sense, some meso-institutional arrangements (such as POs, IBOs, 
protection consortia) are private in nature and get their legitimacy from the 
institutions that delineate their role through general rules. They also share a 
distinctive property since they establish and enforce contractual arrangements 
identified as “hybrids”, as they combine self-regulation mechanisms operated 
by private partners along the supply chain with a legal framework that deter-
mines the conditions and modalities under which these mechanisms operate 
(Royer et al., 2015). 
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What is under investigation is if these meso-institutions, by opting for hy-
brid forms of collective arrangements, are able to establish optimal conditions 
for an appropriate alignment between rules of the game established through 
the CAP and organizational choices in order to reduce transaction costs. Such 
a process mostly concerns European efforts to improve the functioning of the 
agri-food supply chain and to address the increasing exogenous uncertainties 
surrounding transactions in agriculture that make agreeing on price, quality 
and volume more complex. 
In this sense, an organization is very often the way to implement and op-
erationalize the rules of the game, as they are defined by the institutional en-
vironment, and this process somehow gives birth to “hybrid forms” (Ménard, 
1995). Recent decades have seen an increasing interest in the development of 
these nonstandard modes of organization in agri-food networks, particularly 
in Europe where agricultural production is purposefully embedded in various 
and changing institutional environments, yet producers compete in increas-
ingly global market (Mènard and Klein, 2004). Hybrids are a class of arrange-
ment included by Williamson between market and hierarchies. Such a mode 
is characterized by semi-strong incentives and an intermediate degree of ad-
ministrative apparatus (Williamson, 1991). Indeed, modes of collective organ-
ization of the hybrid type have spread everywhere in the agri-food industry. 
Despite the apparent heterogeneity of hybrids, some main characteristics allow 
us to identify such governance forms: i) parties pool part of their resources 
while keeping property rights and associated decision rights distinct because 
they expect higher performance; ii) higher performances can be obtained 
through reduced uncertainty thanks to risk sharing, joint efforts to master 
complexity and benefits from spill over effects that not only affect shared as-
sets but can also benefit those assets held separately; iii) mutually advanta-
geous benefits can be obtained thanks to modalities of governance based on 
a durable relationship through which reputation is built so that the identity of 
the parties matters; iv) shared rights and decisions do not preclude competi-
tion among partners; v) the overlap of rights, the grey area surrounding the 
usage of shared resources, and the expected externalities make the definition 
and implementation of rent sharing rules particularly challenging; and vi) the 
main mechanism implemented for coordination is contractual (Mènard, 2018; 
Ménard and Valceschini, 2005). 
However, more effort is needed in order to shed light on the role of meso-
institutions as “chains of transmission” between the institutional environment 
and hybrid arrangements in an agri-food supply chain faced with increasing 
and widespread uncertainty (Ménard, 2004; 2014a). 
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3. Material and methods
Due to its descriptive nature, the most suitable method to pursue the aim 
of the paper is the case study approach. Specifically, based on the number of 
case studies under analysis (Fig. 1), a multiple-holistic case study design is 
adopted (Yin, 2009). 
The research design is composed of case studies related to three different 
sectors (tobacco, cheese and wine). Criteria of selection were twofold. First, 
these sectors have been highly affected by the transition from an intervention-
ist-CAP (characterized by a high level of subsidies and rules) to a deregulated-
CAP (characterized by a low level of subsidies and less prescriptive rules) that 
increased the role of uncertainty in affecting economic transactions; second, 
they are all strategic sectors for Italian agriculture (under both the social and 
Fig. 1. Types of design for case studies.
Source: Yin (2009).
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the economic point of view) and are characterized by a high level of specific 
investments (for technology, marks, machinery and so on). In more detail, the 
units of analysis are the following:
• the IBO “Tabacco Italia” is a unique case of an IBO at the European level 
in the tobacco sector, representing more than 80% of the tobacco contract-
ed in Italy, and benefitting from the possibility of applying the extension of 
rules contained in a specific contractual agreement to non-members (Cilib-
erti and Frascarelli, 2017).
• the protection consortium of “Grana Padano PDO” for the cheese sector is 
one of the few cases of the application of binding rules for the regulation of 
supply for PDO/PGI cheese which was established by the European Union 
(Chiodini and Frascarelli, 2016).
• the Protection Consortia for the wine sector represents an interesting case 
study since in Italy as they can perform functions that are granted to Pro-
ducer Organizations (POs) and Interbranch Organizations (IOs) at the Eu-
ropean level, including the possibility to extend erga omnes the effective-
ness of their rules (Paoloni and Gioia, 2017).
With respect to materials, the reliability of the case studies is substanti-
ated by means of the triangulation of evidence (Yin, 2009). This method en-
tails the convergence of empirical evidence from multiple sources of data in 
supporting the event or fact under investigation. Information gathering was 
conducted from April 2015 to July 2017 using three main sources of evidence: 
documents, multiple (direct and participant) observations and open-ended in-
terviews. As concerns the documents, they were mainly collected thanks to di-
rect access to both private documents (such as statutes, memoranda, internal 
regulations) as well to public regulation and official study reports. With regard 
to direct observation and open-ended interviews, they were carried out by 
means of direct contact with key stakeholders and privileged witnesses, such 
as the National Secretary of IBOs Tobacco Italia, the President of the protec-
tion consortium of PDO Grana Padano and some directors of the consortia 
for the protection of Italian wine. In more detail, observations consisted of 
site visits and participation in formal activities, such as job meetings, brief-
ings, and assemblies. During the aforementioned meetings, members were in-
terviewed and asked their opinions regarding the topic under investigation. In 
some cases, interviews were repeated in order to update information and data. 
4. Cases under analysis and descriptive findings
Case studies are presented in this section, paying attention to the impact 
of CAP rules on the establishment of specific forms of institutionalized hybrid 
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arrangements. For each case under analysis, the evolution and the main as-
pects of the regulatory framework – both at the European and national levels 
– are analysed and their effects on the organization regarding transaction and 
allocation of both property and decision rights are described. In this regard, it 
must be noted that, according to the principle of subsidiarity, member states 
have a certain degree of freedom in laying down specific rules for the imple-
mentation of CAP at the national level so that the objectives of an action can 
be sufficiently achieved.
4.1 The IBO Tabacco Italia
The EU’s Common Market Organization (CMO) provided unlimited sup-
port for European tobacco production, making this crop the most highly sub-
sidized in relation to the area under cultivation. More recently, the CAP re-
form 2014-2020 removed all of the justifications for fostering the adoption of 
contracts between producers and the industry in order to regulate provisions 
regarding tobacco (Ciliberti and Frascarelli, 2014). Thus, it follows that the 
absence of a specific incentive may generate two main issues for the tobacco 
supply chain in Italy, namely, a further decrease in tobacco production, espe-
cially in less suitable and less developed areas, and a greater uncertainty about 
deliveries to first processors and manufacturers. This condition could threaten 
the functioning of the entire tobacco industry in Italy because without a com-
petitive supply stage that guarantees stable deliveries, no subsequent stage will 
function effectively. Therefore, to address such a dangerous situation, share-
holders have exploited the new rules of the CAP 2014-2020 reform and, more 
specifically, reg. (EU) 1308/2013 (CMO). This approach resulted in the found-
ing of the IBO Tabacco Italia (OIT) in 2015, which aims to reorganize the en-
tire supply chain by fostering a tight and effective coordination between farm-
ers and the industry due to an Interbranch agreement (IA) that oversees the 
main aspects of deliveries including price, quality, and other factors.
Members of the IBO Tabacco Italia are representatives of both produc-
ers (UNITAB and ONT) and first processors (APTI)3. The OIT was formally 
3 Specifically, the UNITAB is an association of Italian producers that are also members of the 
European association of Tobacco Growers. The ONT was founded in 2002 and was legally 
recognised by the MAFFP in 2010; it includes tobacco POs from Campania, Umbria, and 
Tuscany and represents more than 60% of Italian production by volume. Finally, the APTI 
represents both Italian first processors and exporters. Its members are the biggest firms in 
this sector (e.g. multinational enterprises as well as cooperatives) and process approxima-
tely 75,000 tonnes of tobacco every year (that is, approximately 60% of the national volume 
processed).
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recognized under the legislation previously in force, and in 2015, the newly 
adopted framework confirmed their recognition. Moreover, according to Ar-
ticle 157 of reg. (EU) 1308/2013, the OIT pursues specific aims that entail the 
following activity areas: i) organization of supply and market control, ii) co-
ordination of supply chain relationships, iii) quality of production and com-
petition policy, iv) research and development, and v) environmental compli-
ance and sustainable production. The OIT elaborated on two agreements (the 
so-called interbranch agreement, IA) for the periods of 2015-2017 and 2018-
2020, which have been approved by the MAFFP (Ministry of Agricultural, 
Food and Forestry Policies). The IA established a comprehensive framework 
for the conclusion of cultivation contracts of raw tobacco and minimum qual-
ity requirements for tobacco products. They represent collective arrangements 
that control many aspects in order to foster the coordination and marketing 
of raw tobacco in Italy. The IA defines the main elements of contract farming 
between producers and processors/manufacturers (article 2) as well as qualita-
tive requirements for raw tobacco (article 3). More specifically, the IA shows a 
model of the contract4 valid for the period 2015-2017 and 2016-2019, which in-
volves on the one hand PO and/or APO and on the other hand first processors 
or manufacturers (Fig. 2).
Furthermore, since it regroups more than two-thirds of the production 
volume, the MAFFP has allowed IBO Tobacco Italia to extend the rules set out 
in the agreement to non-members, allowing the payment of a financial con-
tribution (extension of fees) by non-members with a view to finance their in-
stitutional objectives and, in particular, to promote the relevant sector, prod-
uct or product category. As a consequence, the relevant IBO rules are legally 
binding on all business operators in the sector. Finally, the enforcement of 
such an extension of rules is ensured by the Central Institute for Food Quality 
and Food Fraud Repression (ICQRF), which is part of the MAFFP. Sanctions 
in the form of financial penalties may range from 1,000 EUR to 50,000 EUR. 
When a non-member fails to comply with IBO’s rules regarding the applica-
4  Furthermore, according to article 168 of reg. (EU) 1308/2013 and article 62 of decree law 24 
January 2012 (“Cresci Italia” Decree), the OIT establishes that every delivery of raw tobacco 
in Italy by a producer to a processor must be covered by a contract among the parties and 
that the first purchasers (processors/manufacturers) must make an offer for a contract (Cili-
berti and Frascarelli, 2013). Furthermore, any contract or offer for a contract shall be made in 
writing and shall be made in advance of the delivery as well. Contracts must include, in parti-
cular, the following elements: i) the price, ii) the quantity and quality of the products and the 
timing of deliveries, iii) the duration of the contract, iv) details regarding the payment period, 
and v) arrangements for collecting or delivering products. However, it should be noted that 
all elements of contracts for the delivery of agricultural products concluded by producers, 
collectors, processors or distributors shall be freely negotiated between the parties.
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tion of standard contracts that regulate the purchase of agri-food products, the 
application of sanctions amounting to 10% of the value of the contracts con-
cluded in breach of those rules is implemented.
4.2 The regulation of supply for the PDO Grana Padano 
EU quality policy aims to protect and promote products with unique char-
acteristics linked to their geographical origin as well as traditional know-how. 
Products can be granted a “geographical indication” (GI) if they have a specif-
ic link to the place where they are made. The GI recognition enables consum-
ers to trust and distinguish quality products while also helping producers to 
better market their products. PDO is a GI that guarantees that the product is 
from a specific region and follows a particular traditional production process. 
More specifically, PDO implies that every part of the production, processing 
and preparation process must take place in the specified region.
In the dairy sector, the so-called “milk package” (reg. (EU) 261/2012 in-
tegrated in the reg. (EU) 1308/2013) introduced a specific regulation for the 
Fig. 2. The Italian tobacco supply chain and the role of the IBO Tabacco Italia.
Source: Ciliberti and Frascarelli (2017).
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supply of PDO or PGI cheese. It allows the establishment of a set of rules with 
the purpose of checking the flow of cheese into the market. More specifically, 
upon the request of a PO, an IBO or a protection consortium, member states 
may lay down, for a limited period of time, binding rules for the regulation of 
supply of a PDO/PGI cheese.
The European and Italian regulatory framework clarifies how to realize 
productive plans for the regulation of supply. Specifically, article 150 of the 
CMO states that the regulation of the cheese supply with a protected designa-
tion of origin can be introduced upon request by a producer’s organization, 
an IBO or a protection consortium and must comply with the given restraints 
to avoid violating the rules of competition. This regulation was enforced in 
Italy through a decree by the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Forestry on 
12 October 2012. It listed the guidelines for devising plans for the regulation 
of supply. 
Regulation of the cheese supply in Italy has been introduced for some 
cheeses (Grana Padano PDO, Parmigiano Reggiano PDO, Asiago PDO and 
Pecorino Romano PDO). Among these, regulation of the supply of Grana 
Padano PDO (Fig. 3) is the most interesting because this regulation has been 
in effect the longest. 
This supply regulation scheme underwent several changes over the years; 
however, the idea of the consortium for the safeguarding of Grana Padano 
paved the way for the introduction of this tool in the EU. The supply regula-
tion scheme adopted by Grana Padano includes the certification system that 
characterizes most of the products with PDO and PGI. The current Grana 
Padano PDO plan covers the planning period from 2016 to 2018 and strives to 
control the supply in order to align supply and demand by means of consoli-
dating the presence of the product in the main markets and the acquisition of 
new marketplaces, quality promotion and safeguards (Chiodini and Frascarel-
li, 2016). Specifically, regulation of the supply plan utilizes the following four 
tools: 
1. Regular contribution based on the global production level of Grana Pada-
no. The Consortium has assigned a reference point (RP) to each dairy farm 
to which a so-called “regular contribution” corresponds. Over the course 
of a year, each dairy farm pays a regular contribution on a monthly basis, 
on average 5€/wheel (the range varies from 4,82 €/wheel to 5,48 €/wheel, 
according to the weight of the wheels) for the number of wheels produced 
per month; 
2. Differential contribution. When the production of one or more dairy farms 
exceeds the reference point assigned, the consortium will levy additional 
contributions in consideration of the greater allocation of resources for 
qualitative and promotional improvements to market the surplus produc-
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Fig. 3. The supply chain of the PDO Grana Padano: actors and stage.
Source: Martino et al. (2016).
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tion. This system is called “differential contribution”. The differential con-
tribution grows by 1% according to the production levels, with a charge in-
creasing by 7,5 €/wheel per level. Above 8%, each wheel’s differential con-
tribution is 60€;
3. Redistribution of the wheels. The consortium, above the set differential 
contribution, redistributes a given number of wheels, which will propor-
tionally decrease when the threshold is not achieved;
4. Quality prize. To valorise quality, the consortium has established a qual-
ity valorisation criterion as follows: If the percentage of the dairy farm’s 
premium cheese is higher than 80% of the total, there is a 25% increase 
in the distribution of the wheels. If the percentage of premium cheese is 
90%, there is a 10% reduction in the contribution charge in addition to the 
abovementioned bonus.
4.3 The consortia for protection of Italian wine
The Italian wine production system is strongly fragmentated and a large 
majority of vine area is still managed by small farms with fewer than 10 hec-
tares. The supply chain of the wine sector (Fig. 4) is characterized by a struc-
tural duality since, on the one hand, there are thousands of small farms that 
often produce for their own consumption and, on the other hand, there are 
companies with high levels of professionalism and high production of wine 
(Gori and Alampi Sottini, 2014). For processing, there is a very high number 
of wine processors that are divided into three different typologies: i) farm wine 
cellars, which convert grapes produced on the farm; ii) industrial wineries, 
which exclusively process wine grapes purchased on the market; and iii) coop-
erative wine cellars, which process both grapes from their members and those 
purchased on the market. This latter type is the most relevant in terms of wine 
production, even though farm wine cellars are the most numerous. Moreover, 
there are also several bottlers because bottling is often a not profitable produc-
tion stage for small farm wine cellars. All in all, strong fragmentation in both 
the production and processing stages causes relevant problems of coordination 
along the wine supply chain with negative consequences for sales. 
Against this framework, over the past few decades, the number of Italian 
wine farms as well as the land used for viticulture has greatly decreased. In 
the same period, however, it must be noted that areas cultivated for certified 
wine (PDO and PGI) have increased. In Italy, PDO and PGI wines are clas-
sified into four categories: Denominazione di origine controllata e garantita 
(DOCG) e Denominazione d’origine controllata (DOC) for the former and In-
dicazione geografica territoriale (IGT) for the latter. These geographical indi-
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cations mean that the grapes have to come exclusively from the geographical 
area where the wine is made. Most importantly, these wines are safeguarded 
by protection consortia that are also allowed to define and enforce specific in-
ternal management policies. As of now, 120 consortia have been recognized in 
Italy, mainly for PDO wine.
Regulation 1308/2013 (CMO) has opened up new and important perspec-
tives for consortia. The EU legislation has ﬁnally provided the deﬁnition of 
IBOs that was later made into law in Italy and assigned for the ﬁrst time to 
the consortia. As a matter of fact, reg. (EU) 1308/2013 stated that IBOs can 
be acknowledged as representatives of the economic activities linked to the 
production and at least one of the phases of processing or trade. Since con-
sortia are indeed currently represented by categories of growers, winemak-
ers and bottlers, it follows that each of the wine consortium, as an inter-pro-
fessional organization, is responsible for the designation, the rules (production 
speciﬁcation) that are the basis of its identity and its evolution and adaptation 
to consumer’s tastes. Based on article 41 of law 238/2016 (that substituted art. 
17 of legislative decree 61/2010), the consortia pursue speciﬁc objectives and 
Fig. 4. The supply chain of wine.
Source: own elaboration.
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Tab. 1. Case studies: main findings.
Grana Padano PDO Consortia for the 
protection of wine
IBO Tabacco Italia (OIT)
EU regulatory 
framework
Art. 150 reg. (EU) 
1308/2012
Art. 167 reg. (EU) 
1308/2013




MAFFP decree n. 
15164/2012.
Art. 41, Legge 12 
dicembre 2016, n. 238 
(ex-Art. 17, D.Lgs. n. 
61/2010)
D.D. n. 2858 del 
07/08/2015
Right holder Protection Consortium Protection Consortium 
(IBO, acc. to point (5) 
of art. 1 of Ministerial 
Decree, December 16th, 
2010)
IBO
Member (no.) ‒ Cheese factories: 130






‒ Tobacco POs: 2
‒ First processors: 1 
(association)
Capacity Define and coordinate a 
productive plan for the 
regulation of the supply 
of cheese benefiting 
from a protected 
designation of origin 
or from a protected 
geographical indication.
‒ Define policies for the 
regulation of supply 
and plans for quality 
improvement;
‒ organization and 
coordination of 
the activities of 
who is involved 
in production and 
commercialization;
‒ act to protect and to 
safeguard the PDO 
or PGI and to protect 
producers’ interests 
and rights;






‒ Organization of 
supply and market 
control;
‒ coordination of supply 
chain relationships;
‒ quality of production 
and competition 
policy;
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may perform several activities for this purpose. Specifically, they are responsi-
ble for the managing of production in respect to the market (also providing, in 
agreement with the region, restrictive yield measures), stock management, and 
new registration of vines to a DO at the Land Registry. Finally, they are respon-
sible for increasing the value of the product and for protecting the designation.
Another important aspect is related to the so-called “erga omnes” authori-
zation. National legislation (art. 17, par. 4 of the abovementioned legislative 
Grana Padano PDO Consortia for the 
protection of wine
IBO Tabacco Italia (OIT)
Representativeness 
for extension of 




Two-thirds of the 
milk producers or 
their representatives 
representing at least two-
thirds of the raw milk 
used for the production 
of the cheese, and, 
where relevant, at 
least two-thirds of 
the producers of that 
cheese representing 
at least two-thirds 
of the production 
of that cheese in the 
geographical area.
40% of the vine 
grower and 66% of the 
production of registered 
vineyards within their 
PDO or PGI, calculated 
on the declared amount 
produced in the 
preceding two years.
Two-thirds of the 
volume of the 
production of, the trade 
in, or the processing of 
the product or products 
concerned.
Tool Plan for the regulation 
of supply, submitted to 
the MAFFP.
Production management 
policy submitted to the 
MAFFP.
IBO agreement 
submitted to the 
MAFFP.
Associative cost Variable (based on 
production)
Variable or fixed or 
mixed
Fixed
Definition of a 
contract scheme
No No Yes
Extension of rules Who is inserted in the 
control system





Cheese producers Grape producers and 
bottlers, with or without 
grape processing
Primary producers and 
primary processors
Tool extension Relevance area of 
geographical indication
Relevance area of 
geographical indication
National
Controls CSQA Various subject ICQRF
Source: our elaboration.
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decree n.61/2010) speciﬁes that consortia demonstrating a higher level of rep-
resentativeness (at least 40% of winegrowers and at least 66% of the produc-
tion of registered vineyards within their PDO or PGI) can get further minis-
terial authorization to carry out such extended functions towards all subjects 
included in the control system, even to the ones that are not members of the 
consortium. Consortia that have received the “erga omnes” authorization are 
allowed to implement supply management policies, to improve the organiza-
tion and coordination of stakeholders along the supply chain and to under-
take judicial or administrative autonomous acts for the protection of the des-
ignation.
As concerns the specific actions aimed at managing production, in order 
to safeguard the quality of the wine as well as to improve the marketing of 
products, the following rules related to the management of production can be 
extended to non-members of a consortium that has obtained the extension of 
rules:
• Storage of a percentage of the production during favourable years to ad-
dress potential lack of production thereafter;
• Reduction of the maximum grapes/wine yield  for PDO/PGI wine (or the 
maximum yield of grape per hectare) in order to ensure a market equilib-
rium;
• Control of registration in the “vineyard register” that allows the procure-
ment of the PDO/PGI;
• Establishment of other systems to ensure a proper management of available 
wine volumes in order to regulate both the supply of grapes and storage.
To sum up, this case study highlights how European and Italian regulation 
(respectively, by means of article 167 of reg. (EU) 1308/2013 and art. 41 of law 
238/2016) allows protection consortia to play a relevant role for guaranteeing 
the quality of production as well as for managing and regulating the supply 
of PDO wines (Paoloni, 2012). Most importantly, based on consortia requests, 
such rules can be extended thanks to specific actions undertaken by admin-
istrative regions. What emerges is that consortia for the protection of Italian 
PDO and PGI wines can take advantage of the European and national regula-
tory framework to ensure proper management and coordination of the supply 
of wine. In this regard sense, consortia may enforce a strict internal regula-
tion, based on the limitations of the registration of the vineyards in the “vine-
yard register for PDO/PGI” with the aim to avoid overproduction. 
Finally, Table 1 summarizes the main findings related to the case studies 
under investigation. It reports information on the regulatory framework that 
defines specific rules for the establishment and the functioning of the organi-
zational arrangements analysed. 
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5. Discussion and Conclusions
The new regulatory framework introduced by the CAP has offered some 
solutions to improve the coordination of decisions along the agri-food supply 
chains. What emerged in the sector under investigation is the diffusion of spe-
cific meso-institutions (e.g. IBO, consortia) that promote hybrid organization-
al solutions based on contractual arrangements (e.g. IA, regulation of supply) 
extended to non-members that mix autonomous adaptation, as in markets, 
and cooperative adaptation, as in hierarchies. These institutional-embedded 
hybrids are aimed at making parties cooperate since they pool part of their re-
sources while keeping their property rights and decision rights distinct in or-
der to reduce both endogenous and exogenous uncertainty (risk sharing) that 
increasingly surrounds transactions, realize higher economic performance, 
benefit from reciprocal learning effects, establish durable relationships that 
ensure the stability of supply, build a positive reputation and, last but not least, 
reduce the risk of rent sharing. 
What emerged in the three case studies under analysis is that CAP has at-
tributed an increasing role to meso-institutional solutions that promote the 
diffusion of hybrid forms of collective arrangements. However, this paper also 
shows that these latter forms mainly spread in the presence of both specific 
investments surrounding transactions. This is the case in the sectors inves-
tigated since these investments would allow the minimization of the costs of 
governance in the presence of an increasing uncertainty. In other words, these 
embedded hybrids developed when partners found some advantages in linking 
some of their investments and in establishing and accepting mutual depend-
ence; that is most likely when asset specificity is high, and uncertainty is gain-
ing momentum.
Finally, some interesting implications for policymakers also emerge. First, 
the CAP has promptly fostered the diffusion of collective arrangements aimed 
at addressing increasing uncertainty due to the dismantlement of market inter-
ventions (such as the milk quota system for the cheese sector, vineyard planting 
rights for the wine sector and deficiency payment and coupled support for the 
tobacco sector) that created several problems of coordination along the agri-
food supply chain. Against this backdrop, it is important to note that, in order 
to foster the diffusion of other hybrid organizational arrangements in the agri-
food supply chain, it is strategic that the process of institutional embeddedness 
of meso-institutions established by the CAP continues. 
However, the paper also has some limitations since it is clear that the case 
studies are descriptive in nature and cannot provide empirical evidence of the 
effectiveness of the organizational arrangements promoted by the CAP. Fur-
ther studies supported by quantitative analyses are needed in order to explore 
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this knowledge gap as well as to investigate and compare similar experiences 
in member states with long-standing traditions in the use of such policy in-
struments.
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